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BONG HITS 4 JESUS AND TINKERING WITH TINKER
EDWARD J. SCHOEN∗
JOSEPH S. FALCHEK∗∗
I. INTRODUCTION
In Morse v. Frederick (hereinafter referred to as Morse), the U.S. Supreme Court
ruled that suspending a student from school for unfurling a banner during a high
school sponsored and supervised event did not violate the First Amendment.1 The
event was the 2002 Olympic Torch Relay. On its way to the winter games in Salt Lake
City, Utah, the parade passed through Juneau, Alaska, and along the street on which
the high school was located.2 The high school, Juneau-Douglas High School, declared
the Torch Relay to be an approved event, and permitted its students, monitored by
faculty and staff, to leave class to watch the parade on both sides of the street.3 The
student, Joseph Frederick, unfurled a 14-foot banner containing the phrase “Bong Hits 4
Jesus” just as the Torch Parade and camera crews went by.4 The high school principal,
Deborah Morse, confiscated the banner, ordered Frederick to report to her office, and
suspended him from school for ten days, because she thought the sign encouraged
illegal drug use in violation of school policy.5
The Juneau School District
Superintendent upheld the suspension, because the banner appeared to advocate the
use of illegal drugs.6
In deciding that the suspension imposed on Frederick did not violate the First
Amendment, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that it was reasonable for principal
Morse to conclude that the banner promoted illegal drug use contrary to school policy
and that her failure to act would be construed by the students as a lack of commitment
by the school to its policy combating illegal drug use.7 “The First Amendment,” the
Court said, “does not require schools to tolerate at school events student expression that
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J.D., Professor of Management, Rowan University, Glassboro, New Jersey.
J.D., Professor of Business Administration and Chairperson of the Business and Administration
and Management Department, King’s College, Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania.
1 Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2629 (2007).
2 Id. at 2622.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id. at 2622-2623.
6 Id. at 2623.
7 Id. at 2629.
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contributes to those dangers.”8 Hence public school administrators can now curtail
student expression whenever they reasonably conclude student speech undermines an
“important interest,” such as deterring drug usage by school children.9
Morse is the third and most significant departure from the First Amendment
protections accorded public school students in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District (hereinafter referred to as Tinker).10 In order to assess the
impact of Morse, this article seeks in Part II to examine the First Amendment protection
provided by Tinker and to explore in Parts III and IV how the two intervening decisions,
Bethel School District v. Fraser (hereinafter referred to as Fraser)11 and Hazlewood School
District v. Kuhlmeier (hereinafter referred to as Kuhlmeier),12 facilitated the Morse
decision. Part V returns to Morse and analyses the majority, concurring and dissenting
opinions to ascertain how they might be applied in future cases. Finally, in Part VI, this
article seeks to determine whether the purpose of public school education still plays a
role in resolving First Amendment issues in public school speech disputes.
II. TINKER V. DES MOINES INDEPENDENT COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT
In order to demonstrate their opposition to the war in Vietnam and their support
for a truce to end the hostilities, a group of adults and students in Des Moines, Iowa,
decided to wear black armbands during the 1965 holiday season.13 Two families, the
Tinkers and the Eckhardts, chose to participate.14 Learning of the plan to wear
armbands, the principals of the Des Moines schools “met and adopted a policy that any
student wearing an armband to school would be asked to remove it, and if he refused
he would be suspended until he returned without the armband.”15 Three students,
John Tinker, age 15, Christopher Eckhardt, age 16, and Mary Beth Tinker, age 13
(hereinafter referred to as Petitioners), wore armbands to school, were suspended from
school, and returned to school after the planned period for wearing armbands
expired.16 Petitioners’ fathers filed an action on their behalf under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to
obtain an injunction preventing the school district from taking disciplinary action
against Petitioners.17
Concluding the school district’s disciplinary action was
reasonably necessary to prevent disruption of school discipline, the District Court after
an evidentiary hearing dismissed the complaint.18 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit heard the case en banc, but was equally divided in its opinion, thereby affirming
the District Court.19

Id.
Id. at 2627 (“deterring drug use by schoolchildren is an ‘important—indeed, perhaps compelling’
interest”).
10 Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community Sch. Dist., 89 S. Ct. 733 (1969).
11 Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986).
12 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. 562 (1988).
13 Tinker, 89 S. Ct. at 735.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id. The Eighth Circuit declined to follow a contrary decision by the Fifth Circuit, which ruled in
Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (1966), that wearing armbands cannot be prohibited under
the First Amendment unless that activity “materially and substantially interfere[s] with the
requirements of appropriate discipline on the operation of the school.”
8
9
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The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the District Court’s decision,20 noting that, under
“the unmistakable holding of this Court for almost 50 years,” 21 “[i]t can hardly be
argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”22 The Court based its decision on three
interrelated factors: the purpose of public education, the nature of the expression, and
the absence of any disruption to school activities. The Court determined that, because
public education is designed to prepare students for citizenship, it is imperative that
school activities be conducted within the limits of the Bill of Rights.23 Protecting
constitutional freedoms in schools, the Court said, teaches young minds not “to
discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes.”24
Petitioners wore their armbands in school without any accompanying disruptive
conduct, and their expression constituted “direct, primary First Amendment rights akin
to ‘pure speech,’”25 which is “entitled to comprehensive protection under the First
Amendment.”26 By silently and passively wearing the armbands, Petitioners created no
disorder or disturbance, did not interfere with school activities, and did not impinge on

Tinker, 89 S. Ct. at 741.
Id. at 736
22 Id.
23 Id. at 737.
24 Id. (citing West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943) for the proposition that students in
schools may not be compelled to salute the flag).
25 Tinker, 89 S. Ct. at 737.
26 Id. The notion of “pure speech” arose when the focus in resolving First Amendment matters was
on the so called “speech-action dichotomy,” under which courts determined that speech alone
was absolutely protected by the First Amendment, but the actions undertaken to communicate
the speech could be regulated. See Donald M. Gillmor et al, MASS COMMUNICATION LAW: CASES
AND COMMENTS, at 80 (6th ed. (1998) (“A generation ago, the distinction between speech and
action was important to understanding the scope of First Amendment Protection. Under this
approach, speech was absolutely protected while action could be regulated.”). In Tinker, the
silent and passive wearing of armbands by school students produced no reaction or disturbance;
hence, the speech was “pure speech” which could not be restricted or regulated under the First
Amendment. A precursor to this approach appears in Stromberg v. California, 51 S. Ct. 532
(1931), in which the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a statute, which prohibited the passive
display of a flag in a public place as a sign of opposition to organized government, was
unconstitutional, because it prohibited peaceful and orderly opposition to government by legal
means. A more recent application of the “pure speech” doctrine occurred in Spence v.
Washington, 94 S. Ct. 2727 (1974), in which the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the First
Amendment prohibited prosecution of the defendant for misusing a flag, when he affixed a peace
symbol to the American flag and displayed it upside down in his window to protest the invasion
of Cambodia. Because there was no evidence any people reacted to the inverted flag or even
noticed it, the speech was “pure speech” which the government cannot regulate. A similar result
occurred in Cohen v. California, 91 S. Ct. 1780 (1971). In Cohen, the defendant was convicted of
disturbing the peace for walking through a municipal courthouse wearing a jacket on which the
words “Fuck the Draft” were plainly visible. The U.S. Supreme Court overturned the conviction,
determining that he wore the jacket to express his opposition to the war in Vietnam and the draft,
that he did not thrust his message at viewers, that viewers could easily avert their eyes from the
message, and that there was no evidence anyone was angered or disturbed by the message. The
U.S. Supreme Court refused to apply the “pure” speech theory in United States v. O’Brien, 88 S.
Ct. 1673 (1968). In O’Brien, the defendant was convicted for publically burning his draft card to
encourage others to join him in his antiwar efforts, contrary to the 1965 amendment to the
Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1948 which proscribed the deliberate destruction
of Selective Service registration certificates. The U.S. Supreme Court determined that the 1965
amendment supported an important government interest (maintaining an efficient draft system)
and prohibited conduct, not expression, and upheld the conviction.
20
21
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the rights of other students.27 As such, Petitioners engaged in pure speech, which
cannot be regulated by the government.28
The District Court had concluded that the suspension of Petitioners by the school
officials was reasonable, because the school officials feared that the wearing of
armbands in school would create disturbance.29 That justification, however, was
deemed by the U.S. Supreme Court to be woefully insufficient to prohibit the
expression of opinion, because the expression of any opinion which differs from the
views of others always creates the risk of triggering a disturbance.30 Under the First
Amendment, school officials cannot prohibit expression merely because they “desire to
avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular
viewpoint.”31 Rather, limitations may be placed on students’ expression only when that
expression “materially and substantially interfere[s] with the requirements of
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school.”32 The District Court made no
such finding, and the record lacked any indication that the wearing of armbands
“would substantially interfere with the work of the school or impinge on the rights of
other students.”33 Further, school officials permitted other students to wear other
symbols on their clothing (e.g., political campaign buttons and a symbol of Nazism) in
school, thereby singling out protests against the war in Vietnam for disciplinary
action.34 Punishing the expression of one particular opinion without any evidence that
it is “necessary to avoid material and substantial interference with schoolwork or
discipline” violates the First Amendment.35
The Tinker decision is important in two major respects. First, Tinker holds school
officials to a tough standard in disciplining student expression. They can do so only
when “it is necessary to avoid material and substantial interference with schoolwork or
discipline.”36 Secondly, Tinker boldly provided First Amendment protection to student
expression in schools, and insisted that public school education should expose students
to more viewpoints than those the State officially approves:
In our system, state-operated schools may not be enclaves of
totalitarianism. School officials do not possess absolute authority
over their students. Students in school as well as out of school are
‘persons’ under our Constitution.
They are possessed of
fundamental rights which the State must respect, just as they
themselves must respect their obligations to the State. In our
system, students may not be regarded as closed-circuit recipients of
only that which the State chooses to communicate. They may not be
confined to the expression of those sentiments that are officially
approved. In the absence of a specific showing of constitutionally
valid reasons to regulate their speech, students are entitled to
freedom of expression of their views.37

Tinker, 89 S. Ct. at 737.
Id.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 738 (citing Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (1966)).
33 Tinker, 89 S. Ct. at 738.
34 Id. at 739.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 740.
27
28
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III. BETHEL SCHOOL DISTRICT V. FRASER
The Bethel Hill High School scheduled a school-wide assembly during which
students gave, and the 600 attending students listened to, nominating speeches for
candidates for student government offices.38 In endorsing his candidate, Matthew
Fraser employed “an elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor” that inspired
some students to hoot and yell, some to employ graphic gestures reflecting the sexual
activities in his speech, and some to experience embarrassment or bewilderment.39
Fraser had discussed the content of his speech with two of his teachers, both of whom
discouraged him from making it and warned him of the potential consequences.40 The
next morning, the assistant principal called Fraser to her office, and told him his speech
violated a Bethel High School rule prohibiting profane language.41 Fraser admitted
making and deliberately using sexual innuendo in the speech, and the assistant
principal suspended him from school for three days.42 Fraser’s suspension was upheld
by the School District’s hearing officer, and his father, as guardian ad litem, initiated a
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of his son’s First Amendment rights.43
The District Court determined that Fraser’s suspension from school violated his
First Amendment rights, and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed,
rejecting the school district’s determinations that speech, unlike the passive wearing of
an armband, had a disruptive effect on educational activities, and that the school
district had “an interest in protecting a essentially captive audience of minors from
lewd and indecent language in a setting sponsored by the school.”44
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals.45 Two main factors
supported the Supreme Court’s decision: the nature of public education and the
importance of protecting children from exposure to vulgar and offensive language. The
Supreme Court stated that the purpose of public education is to prepare students to be
citizens by inculcating “fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a
democratic political system” and that “the habits and manners of civility” were
included in those values.46 Just as legislative bodies have adopted rules limiting the use
of offensive and indecent expressions in political debates, so too can schools teach
students “the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior”47 and “prohibit the use of
vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse.”48

Bethel Hill Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159, 3161, 3166 (1986).
Id. at 3162. In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan reveals the nature of the metaphor by
quoting the speech as follows: “I know a man who is firm—he’s firm in his pants, he’s firm in his
shirt, his character is firm—but most of all, his belief in you, the students of Bethel, is firm. Jeff
Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in. If necessary, he’ll take an issue and nail
it to the wall. He doesn’t attack things in spurts—he drives hard, pushing and pushing until
finally—he succeeds. Jeff is a man who will go to the very end—even the climax, for each and
every one of you. So vote for Jeff for A. S. B. vice-president—he’ll never come between you and
the best our high school can be.”
Id. at 3166.
40 Id. at 3162.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 3166.
46 Id. at 3163.
47 Id. at 3163-3164
48 Id. at 3164.
38
39
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The Court noted that the sexual innuendo in Fraser’s speech was offensive to both
students and teachers and possibly injurious to younger students in the audience.49
This permitted the Court to apply two previous decisions to support Bethel Hill school
officials’ efforts to shield school children from vulgar and offensive language in public
discourse. The first upheld restrictions on selling sexually oriented materials to
children,50 and the second protected minors from exposure to vulgar and offensive
spoken language in radio broadcasts.51 The Court stated:
Surely it is a highly appropriate function of public school education
to prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse.
Indeed, the ‘fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a
democratic political system’ disfavor the use of terms of debate
highly offensive or highly threatening to others. Nothing in the
Constitution prohibits the states from insisting that certain modes of
expression are inappropriate and subject to sanctions.
The
inculcation of these values is truly the ‘work of the schools.’52
The Court decided that the School District acted properly in suspending Fraser
from school because of his offensive speech. School officials may properly determine
that “vulgar and lewd” speech undermines the school’s basic educational mission, and
that sanctions should be imposed to demonstrate that such speech “is wholly
inconsistent with the ‘fundamental values’ of public school education.”53
Fraser creates an important exception to Tinker. Public school officials may impose
sanctions on students for engaging in sexually explicit speech that undercuts the
school’s effort to teach them that vulgar speech is highly offensive or threatening to
others, contrary to the accepted rules of public discourse.54 School officials may do so in
Id.
Id. at 3165 (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (upholding a statute banning the sale
of sexually oriented material to minors, even though the material was entitled to First
Amendment protection with respect to adults)).
51 Id. (citing FCC v., Pacifica Foundations, 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (upholding the imposition of penalties
on a broadcaster for broadcasting indecent language at a time when children were undoubtedly
in the audience)).
52 Id. at 3164.
53 Id. at 3165.
54 See Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Pico, 102 S. Ct. 2799, 2810 (1982), in which the U.S.
Supreme Court in a plurality decision recognized the school board’s discretion to remove books
from the school library when it deemed them excessively vulgar. The Court stated: Petitioners
rightly possess significant discretion to determine the content of their school libraries. But that
discretion may not be exercised in a narrowly partisan or political manner. If a Democratic
school board, motivated by party affiliation, ordered the removal of all books written by or in
favor of Republicans, few would doubt that the order violated the constitutional rights of the
students denied access to those books. The same conclusion would surely apply if an all-white
school board, motivated by racial animus, decided to remove all books authored by blacks or
advocating racial equality and integration. Our Constitution does not permit the official
suppression of ideas. Thus whether petitioners’ removal of books from their school libraries
denied respondents their First Amendment rights depends upon the motivation behind
petitioners’ actions. If petitioners intended by their removal decision to deny respondents access
to ideas with which petitioners disagreed, and if this intent was the decisive factor in petitioner’
decision, then petitioners have exercised their discretion in violation of the Constitution. To
permit such intentions to control official actions would be to encourage the precise sort of
officially prescribed orthodoxy unequivocally condemned in Barnette. On the other hand,
respondents implicitly concede that an unconstitutional motivation would not be demonstrated if
49
50
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order to show that vulgar speech and lewd conduct are inconsistent with the
fundamental values of public education and undermine its educational mission.55
Three aspects of Fraser should not be overlooked. First, unlike Kuhlmeier and
Morse, the two exceptions to be discussed later in this article, Fraser completed his
speech before sanctions were imposed. Second, Fraser’s offensive and lewd speech was
directed at young students, and such speech is not entitled to First Amendment
protection.56 Third, Frasier’s endorsement of his candidate for the office of student
government vice-president triggered raucous reaction from some students and
embarrassment and bewilderment in others, all of which were disruptive to the
educational activities within Bethel High School. In contrast, the pure speech in Tinker
triggered neither student reaction nor disruption of educational activities.57
Fraser facilitated the Morse decision, because it enabled the Morse court to deduce
two principles: (1) students may have the right to do and say things off campus that
they do not enjoy First Amendment protection to do or say at school; and (2) “[t]he
‘substantial disruption’ standard of Tinker is not ‘absolute,’ and there may be other
justifications besides substantial disruption that school authorities may properly invoke
to restrain harmful speech.”58 Those principles, as developed more fully below, provide
the foundation for the Morse decision.

it were shown that petitioners had decided to remove the books at issue because those books
were pervasively vulgar. (Emphasis in original). See Justin T. Peterson, School Authority v.
Students’ First Amendment rights: Is Subjectivity Strangling the Free Mind at its Source, 2005 MICH. ST.
L. REV. 931, 937-939.
55 The danger inherent in denying First Amendment protection to sexually explicit, lewd or vulgar
speech contrary to the accepted rules of public discourse is the lack of clarity in defining such
speech. See Sarah Slaff, Silencing Student Speech: Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 37 AM.
U. L. REV. 203. 221-22 (1987) (“Bethel adds a murky category to the kinds of student speech that
may be constitutionally prohibited. By ruling that lewd and indecent student speech will receive
no first amendment protection even without a distinct showing of material disruption and
substantial interference, the Supreme Court established an elusive standard of impermissible
student speech. The Court’s decision, as Justice Fortas warned against in Tinker, threatens to
transform students into “closed-circuit” recipients of state-selected communication. In the future,
hoots and yells by students to a rendition of Henry IV may prompt censorship if the reaction is
deemed to materially disrupt or substantially interfere with the educational process. A student
who comprehends the brilliance of Melville’s symbolism may now be prohibited from delivering
a speech to his classmates on the sexual nuances of Moby Dick for fear of damaging the student
audience’s sexual development. Bethel has realized Cohen’s worst fear by suggesting that debate
in a public high school must be cleansed “to suit the most squeamish among us.”)
56 See Ginsberg and Pacifica Foundation, supra notes 50 and 51. Hence, Fraser may be viewed as a
decision withholding First Amendment protection to offensive and lewd speech directed at
young students, rather than as an exception to Tinker.
57 Courts have subsequently interpreted Fraser broadly or narrowly. The former interpretation
treated the Fraser standard as an exception to Tinker, and therefore as an independent standard
without the need to demonstrate disruption of school work or discipline. The latter
interpretation treated the Fraser standard as a modification to Tinker, and therefore required that
the lewd or vulgar speech could not be controlled by school officials unless it also caused
disruption of school work or discipline. See David L. Hudson, Jr. and John E. Ferguson, Jr., A
First Amendment Focus: The Court’s Inconsistent Treatment of Bethel v. Fraser and the Curtailment of
Student Rights, 36 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 181 (2002).
58 Vikram Amar, The Court and the Schools in the 2006 Term, 8 ABA PREVIEW, August 6, 2007, at 442.
See Bruce C. Hafen, Comment, Hazelwood School District and the Role of First Amendment
Institutions, 1988 DUKE L. J. 685, 691-692 (“Seen from the perspective of Hazelwood, Fraser was an
important transitional case that signaled the Court’s willingness to read Tinker more narrowly
than many lower courts had read it. By 1986, the Court could perhaps see that broad
interpretations of Tinker had, along with other factors, reduced schools’ institutional authority in
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IV. HAZLEWOOD SCHOOL DISTRICT V. KUHLMEIER
Students enrolled in the Journalism II course offered by Hazlewood East High
School wrote and edited the Spectrum, a newspaper published and distributed every
three weeks during the school year to students, school staff, and community members.59
The teacher assigned to the Journalism II course submitted page proofs of the May 13th
edition to the principal for review prior to publication.60 The principal objected to two
stories in the newspaper; one described the experiences of three Hazelwood East
students with pregnancy, and the other discussed the impact of divorce on Hazlewood
East students.61 The principal was concerned that the identity of the three pregnant
students might be inferred from the first story and that references to birth control and
sexual activities might be inappropriate for younger students in the school.62 The
principal was also concerned that the students’ family members did not have the
opportunity to respond and would be embarrassed by the student’s comments about
the effects of divorce.63 Pressed by a two-day deadline for printing the paper and not
wanting the paper to be distributed beyond the school year, the principal deleted the
last two pages of the edition, omitting not only the two articles in question but also
additional stories covering teenage marriage, runaways, juvenile delinquency, and
teenage pregnancy.64
Complaining that the principal had violated their First Amendment rights, three
Hazlewood East students who served as staff members for the Spectrum commenced an
action in Federal District Court.65 The Federal District Court determined (1) that school
officials may impose restrictions on student speech in activities (including publication
of the Spectrum in a journalism class) that are an integral component of the educational
function, and (2) that the principal acted reasonably under the circumstances in
omitting the last two pages of the May edition.66 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit reversed, holding that the Spectrum was a public forum for student viewpoints,
that school officials were prohibited from censoring its contents except when
confronted by a material and substantial interference with school work or discipline,
and that there was no evidence in the record from which the school officials might
reasonably forecast disrupted class work or substantial disorder in the school.67
In reversing the Court of Appeals,68 the U.S. Supreme Court first rejected the
notion that the Spectrum was a public forum, offering two reasons for its conclusion: (1)
school facilities are deemed to be public forums only when they have been exclusively
dedicated for use by the public, and (2) the Spectrum was an activity embedded in the
Journalism II course, subject to the control of the teacher assigned to the course and the
ways that undermined their educational effectiveness. Thus, Fraser revealed the Court’s desire to
shore up school authority—a desire that Hazelwood confirms with a concrete and relatively broad
new rule.”)
59 Hazlewood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 1208 S. Ct. 562, 565 (1988). More than 4,500 copies of the
Spectrum were distributed during academic year 1982-1983. The East Hazlewood School District
Board of education allocated funds from its budget for the printing costs of the Spectrum.
60 Id. at 565.
61 Id. at 566.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 567.
68 Id. at 573.
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principal in performing his final review, and school officials never deviated from that
policy.69
The Court then differentiated between the expression of students that happens to
occur on school premises and speech-related activities that are supervised by faculty
members and undertaken as part of the school’s curriculum (e.g., school-sponsored
publications, theatrical productions, and expressive activities).70 In the former situation,
as in Tinker, the First Amendment issue is whether the school is required to tolerate the
speech or can silence the speech.71 In the latter situation, the First Amendment issue is
whether school officials are permitted to exercise control or authority over the student
expression and activities.72
The Court determined that educators are permitted to exercise control over
curriculum-embedded student expression in order to ensure (1) desired learning
objectives are attained, (2) audiences are not exposed to materials inappropriate to their
age and maturity, and (3) the school may disassociate itself from expression that does
not meet its educational standards.73 Thus, for example, schools may withhold
expression that is “ungrammatical, poorly written, inadequately researched, biased or
prejudiced, vulgar or profane or unsuitable for immature audiences,” or refuse to
support expression that associates the school with any political position other than
neutrality or promotes drug or alcohol use or sexual activities inconsistent with the
educational objectives of the school.74 Hence, the Court concluded, “educators do not
offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and content of
student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are
reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”75
The Court examined the conduct of the principal in reviewing the page proofs of
the Spectrum and concluded he acted reasonably in omitting the articles appearing in
the last two pages, given his concerns about the anonymity of the pregnant students,
the impact of the article’s references to birth control and sexual activities on younger
students, and the journalistic fairness of the divorce article.76 Because the principal
acted reasonably under the circumstances as he understood them, he did not violate the
students’ First Amendment rights.
Under Tinker, school officials could not regulate student speech unless it was
disruptive of educational activities. Under Kuhlmeier, school officials are not required to
tolerate speech that is inconsistent with its educational mission. Hence, Kuhlmeier is an
important decision that restores authority to school officials to control student
expression in curriculum-based activities, and replaces Tinker as the controlling
authority in high school newspaper law.77
Id. at 568-569.
Id. at 569-570.
71 Id. at 570.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 571.
76 Id. at 572.
77 See DONALD M. GILLMOR ET AL., MASS COMMUNICATION LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS, at 657 (6th
ed. (1998). In response to Kuhlmeier, seven states—Arkansas, California, Colorado, Iowa, Kansas,
Massachusetts and Oregon—have passed statutes that limit the impact of Kuhlmeier in those
states and preserve greater freedom on the part of student editors. See Student Law Press Center,
Understanding student free-expression laws: Renewed push to pass state laws as courts chip away at First
Amendment rights in schools at http://www.splc.org/report_detail.asp?id=1351&edition=43 at 1
(last visited Dec. 6, 2007; author retains copy). Illinois subsequently passed legislation “to bolster
the First Amendment rights of students working for college newspapers.” Elizabeth F. Farrell,
69
70
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There are, however, some important limitations to Kuhlmeier. First, Kuhlmeier does
not apply to public forums. That means any school newspaper that has been
established as a public forum for student speech or whose student editors have clearly
been given final authority to determine what will be printed in the newspaper will
remain free from school official censorship.78 Second, the regulated speech must be
school sponsored: supervised by teachers, designed to achieve particular learning
outcomes, supported financially by the school, or identified with the name of the
school.79 That means that “[u]nderground, alternative and even extracurricular student
publications still retain much stronger Tinker protections,”80 if they are not financially
supported by the school.81 Third, the restriction on speech must be coupled with
genuine pedagogical concerns or designed to disassociate the school from the student
speech, and must be implemented in a reasonable manner. That means school officials
will be prohibited “[w]hen the censorship has ‘no valid educational purpose,’”82 and
that, when school officials exercise their authority to control student expression, they
should do so in a content-neutral manner.83
Kuhlmeier facilitated Morse because it permitted school officials to censor student
speech within the school even though similar speech could not be censored outside of
the school, established a standard of reasonableness in reviewing the school officials
actions, and acknowledged that Tinker was not the sole basis for restricting student
speech.84 In effect, Kuhlmeier added the school’s educational mission as a third basis for
school official regulation of student speech, supplementing the substantial disruption
basis in Tinker and the lewd and indecent speech basis in Fraser.85
Illinois Lawmakers Approve Bill to Protect Rights of Student Journalists at College newspapers, THE
CHRONICLE REVIEW: TODAY’S NEWS, June 1, 2007, at http://chronicle.com/daily/2007/06/20070
61106n.htm (last visited June 11, 2007; author retains copy).
78 See Student Law Press Center, Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier: A Complete Guide to the
Supreme Court Decision at http://www.splc.org/legalresearch.asp?id=4 at 3 (last visited Dec. 6,
2007; author retains copy).
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 5.
82 Id. at 4.
83 See Planned Parenthood of Southern Nevada, Inc. v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 941 F.2d 817, 829
(1991). The court stated: “‘Control over access to a nonpublic forum can be based on subject
matter and speaker identity so long as the distinctions drawn are reasonable in light of the
purpose served by the forum and are viewpoint neutral.’ The schools’ refusal to publish Planned
Parenthood’s advertisements was viewpoint neutral. Planned Parenthood’s advertisements were
rejected, and schools enacted guidelines excluding advertising that pertains to ‘birth control
products and information,’ in order to maintain a position of neutrality on the sensitive and
controversial issue of family planning and avoid being forced to open up their publications for
advertisements on both sides of the ‘pro-life’—‘pro-choice’ debate. In addition to believing the
copy and Planned Parenthood to be controversial, some principals felt that parents would object
to the advertisement. The school district also viewed Planned Parenthood’s advertisements as
implicating its statutorily prescribed sex education curriculum and sought to avoid conflict with
the state requirements regarding the manner sex education is presented to students.” (citations
omitted)
84 See Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2627 (2007).
85 Amar, supra note 58, at 442. One commentator reconciled Tinker, Fraser and Kuhlmeier as follows:
“The great majority of courts have interpreted Fraser far more broadly and have read the case,
along with Tinker and Kuhlmeier, together to create one rule. Essentially, the rule states: (1) If the
speech involved is lewd, vulgar, or plainly offensive, then school officials may censor it no matter
where, when, or how it occurs; (2) if the speech is school-sponsored, then school officials have
broad discretion to regulate it if their regulations are related to legitimate educational concerns;
and, finally, (3) all other speech is protected and school officials may not censor it unless they can
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V. MORSE V. FREDERICK
As noted in the Introduction, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Morse v. Frederick
that suspending a student from school for unfurling a banner during a high school
sponsored and supervised event did not violate the First Amendment, because his
expression promoted illegal drug usage contrary to school policy, and the school
officials did not want the school to be associated with speech contrary to its policies.
Chief Justice Roberts authored the majority opinion, in which Justices Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas, and Alito joined. Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice
Kennedy joined. Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Souter and
Ginsburg joined. In order to assess the future of Morse, each of these opinions should
be analyzed.
In his majority opinion, Chief Justice Roberts quickly disposed of two issues, ruling
that Frederick’s banner was school speech86 and that its cryptic message promoted the
use of illegal drugs.87 The Court then assessed the impact of Fraser and Kuhlmeier on
Tinker. In the Court’s view, Fraser appended two basic principles to Tinker: (1) students’
constitutionally protected rights of speech in public schools are not automatically
coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings,88 and (2) Tinker is not the only test
applied in resolving student speech questions.89 Likewise, in the Court’s view,
Kuhlmeier established an important justification for school official censorship, namely
that “the public might reasonably perceive” that student expression bears “the
imprimatur of the school.” 90 To avoid this perception, schools may disassociate
themselves from the student speech, “so long as their actions are reasonably related to
legitimate pedagogical concerns."91 In the Court’s view, Kuhlmeier also underscored the
principle that schools may regulate some speech which, outside of the school, the
government cannot regulate.92
Having described its understanding of Tinker, Fraser, and Kuhlmeier, the Court built
its case that “deterring drug use by school children is an ‘important—indeed, perhaps
show the speech has or will cause a material and substantial disruption. Unfortunately, the
courts have not given definition to what lewd, vulgar, or plainly offensive speech is in the school
environment. Instead, most courts have deferred to school officials to provide substance to those
terms. Most courts will only apply the material and substantial disruption test if they find
student expression does not fall into the lewd, vulgar, or plainly offensive category.” Peterson,
supra note 54, at 942-43.
Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2624.
Id. at 2625.
88 Id. at 2626-2627 (“Had Fraser delivered the same speech in a public forum outside the school
context, it would have been protected. In school, however, Fraser’s First Amendment rights were
circumscribed ‘in light of the special characteristics of the school environment.’”)
89 Id at 2627 (“. . . Fraser established that the mode of analysis set forth in Tinker is not absolute.
Whatever approach Fraser employed, it certainly did not conduct the ‘substantial disruption’
analysis prescribed by Tinker.”) (citations omitted)
90 Id. (“Our most recent student speech case, Kuhlmeier, concerned ‘expressive activities that
students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur
of the school.’”)
91 Id.
92 Id. The Court reinforced its view that speech within school can be regulated differently than
speech outside of school by citing the following cases which permit a less stringent application of
Fourth Amendment protections in schools in an effort to combat illegal use of drugs by students:
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47 v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995); New Jersey v. T. L. O., 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985);
and Board of Education v. Earls, 122 S. Ct. 2559 (2002).
86
87
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compelling interest,’”93 by citing various national studies and the congressional policy
reflected in the Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act of 199494 and noting
that “[t]housands of school boards throughout the country . . . have adopted policies
armed at effectuating this message.”95 The Court then coupled the special nature of
public school education to the compelling interest in combating drug usage by children
to add support its decision.96
The principles the Court elicited from Tinker, Fraser, and Kuhlmeier—speech inside
school can be treated differently than speech outside school, Tinker is not the exclusive
principle governing school speech, and schools can censor speech to achieve their
academic mission—coupled with the national policy of preventing drug usage by

school children, drove the decision reached by the Court in Morse,97 and gave the Court
the opportunity to add an expression of sympathy for the difficult job school principals
have:
School principals have a difficult job, and a vitally important one.
When Frederick suddenly and unexpectedly unfurled his banner,
Morse had to decide to act—or not act—on the spot. It was
reasonable for her to conclude that the banner promoted illegal drug
use—in violation of established school policy—and that failing to act
would send a powerful message to the students in her charge,
including Frederick, about how serious the school was about the
dangers of illegal drug use. The First Amendment does not require
schools to tolerate at school events student expression that
contributed to those dangers.98
The concurring opinion of Justice Alito raised three important points. First, the
concurring opinion advocates that Morse should be restricted solely to student speech

Id. at 2628. The Court used language in the Fourth Amendment cases cited supra note 92 to
buttress its position that deterring illegal drug use in schools is a compelling interest.
94 Id. See 20 U. S. C. § 7114(d)(6) (2000 ed., Supp. IV).
95 Id.
96 Id. (The ‘special characteristics of the school environment,’ and the governmental interest in
stopping student drug abuse . . . allow schools to restrict student expression that they reasonably
regard as promoting illegal drug use.)
97 Amar, supra note 58, at 441-442 (“The key justification in this case, said the majority, was the
overwhelming need to discourage and deter illegal drug use. Congress, as well as past
precedents of the Court, wrote Chief Justice Roberts, made clear that school suppression of
speech—even content- or viewpoint-based suppression —was permissible when the ‘speech is
reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use.’ In the present case, while the banner was
cryptic to be sure, its reference to ‘Bong Hits” could easily and reasonably be understood as a
celebration or advocacy of illegal drug use.”)
98 Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2629. See Student Press Law Center, Chipping Away: U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision in Morse v. Frederick leaves narrow hole in landmark Tinker standard at
http://www.splc.org/report_detail.asp? id=1366&edition=43 at 2 (last visited Dec. 6, 2007;
author retains copy). (“The 18-page opinion of the court . . . sympathizes with school officials and
the ‘difficult’ and ‘important’ job they have in shielding students from drug advocacy. Drawing
on an educator’s duty to deter drug use, the majority decision said it would give school officials
legal cover to strike down student speech that can be ‘reasonably regarded’ as encouraging illegal
drug use.”)
93
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that encourages drug usage by school students,99 and eschews the application of the
“special characteristics of the public schools” to any other speech restrictions.100
Second, the concurring opinion warns that a policy permitting school officials to censor
any student expression simply because it interferes with a school’s educational mission
can readily be “manipulated in dangerous ways,” particularly because “some public
schools have defined their educational missions as including the inculcation of
whatever political and social views are held by members of these groups.”101 Third, the
concurring opinion rejects the notion that parents have conferred authority on public
school officials to act in loco parentis to regulate student speech.102
Justice Stevens’ dissenting opinion concedes that, given the custodial relationship
between schools and students in which there is the need for some degree of supervision
and control that cannot be exercised over adults, it “might well be appropriate to
tolerate some targeted viewpoint discrimination in this unique setting.”103 Nonetheless,
the dissenting opinion maintains, a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment
is that the government may not restrict the expression of an idea simply because society
may disagree with the speech or find it disagreeable.104 Rather, there must be some
demonstration that student speech advocating the use of drugs has some “meaningful
chance” of actually accomplishing its objective before school officials can censor the
speech.105 Because the banner made only “a slanting drug reference” (rather than
Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2636 (“I join the opinion of the Court on the understanding that (a) it goes no
further than to hold that a public school may restrict speech that a reasonable observer would
interpret as advocating illegal drug use and (b) it provides no support for any restriction of
speech that can plausibly be interpreted as commenting on any political or social issue, including
speech on issues such as ‘the wisdom of the war on drugs or of legalizing marijuana for medical
use.’”)
100 Id. (“I join the opinion of the Court on the understanding that the opinion does not hold that the
special characteristics of the public schools necessarily justify any other speech restrictions.”)
101 Id. at 2337.
102 Id. at 2637-2638 (“It is a dangerous fiction to pretend that parents simply delegate their
authority—including their authority to determine what their children may say and hear—to
public school authorities. It is even more dangerous to assume that such a delegation of
authority somehow strips public school authorities of their status as agents of the State. Most
parents, realistically, have no choice but to send their children to a public school and little ability
to influence what occurs in school. It is therefore wrong to treat public school officials, for
purposes relevant to the First Amendment, as if they were private nongovernmental actors
standing in loco parentis.”)
103 Id. at 2646.
104 Id. at 2645 (citing Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989)) (The state’s interest in preventing
breaches of the peace was insufficient to justify the defendant’s conviction for burning the flag
where no disturbance of the peace occurred or threatened to occur.). See Terminiello v. Chicago,
69 S. Ct. 894 (1949) (Defendant’s conviction for disorderly conduct for giving a speech inside the
meeting hall that stirred members of the public to protest outside the meeting hall was
unconstitutional under the First Amendment. Freedom of speech must be protected unless the
expression is likely to produce a clear and present danger beyond public inconvenience,
annoyance, or unrest.)
105 Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2647. See Abrams v. United States, 40 S. Ct. 17 (1919) (Holmes, J. dissenting)
(the government may punish speech only when it creates a clear and imminent danger that it
will cause a substantive evil the restriction seeks to prevent); Gitlow v. New York, 45 S. Ct. 625
(1925) (Holmes, J. dissenting) (speech advocating the overthrow of the government can be
punished only when there is a present danger of an attempt to overthrow); Whitney v.
California, 47 S. Ct. 641 (1927) (Brandeis, J. concurring) (supporting the punishment of defendant
not for mere advocacy of overthrowing the government, but for taking a preparatory step
toward that end); Thomas v. Collins, 65 S. Ct. 315 (1945) (restriction of the liberties guaranteed
by the First Amendment can be justified only by clear and present danger to the public welfare);
99
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actually advocating the use of illegal drugs)106 and because the school district did not
show that there was a meaningful chance Frederick’s banner would actually make
students experiment with illegal drugs,107 Frederick’s suspension from school was an
unconstitutional suppression of speech.108
The combination of Justice Alito’s concurring opinion and Justice Kennedy’s
dissenting opinion has provided comfort to free-speech advocates.109 Justice Alito’s
concurring opinion restricts Morse solely to student advocacy of illegal drug use. Justice
Kennedy’s dissenting opinion rejects the use of school official censorship except in cases
in which student speech advocates the use of drugs and there is a meaningful chance
the speech succeeds. Together, the concurring and dissenting opinions garnered five
votes for rejecting future attempts to censor student speech that advocates something
other than illegal drug usage by students.110
Reaction to the Morse decision has been mixed. Some commentators have
expressed fear that the decision, which permits school officials to censor public school
newspapers whenever they reasonably feel the student expression undermines the
educational mission or wish to avoid the school’s association with the student
expression,111 will open the door to restrictions on student speech that is
controversial.112 Others are more sanguine, and have concluded Morse will not have a

Brandenburg v. Ohio, 89 S. Ct. 1827 (1969) (a statute which punishes mere advocacy without
creating a clear and present danger of inciting unlawful conduct violates the First Amendment);
and Cox v. Louisiana, 85 S. Ct. 453 (1965) (defendant’s constitutional rights cannot be denied
simply because of hostility to their assertion or exercise).
106 Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2649 (describing Frederick’s banner as “a nonsense message, not advocacy,”
causing one commentator to question whether the First Amendment should protect nonsense).
See Amar, supra note 58, at 442 (“Interestingly, Justice Stevens never explains why, if the message
was itself nonsense, the First Amendment should protect it so vigorously in the first place.”) The
authors of this article disagree. If the speaker’s speech is rendered incomprehensible because of
a stroke, the First Amendment should nonetheless protect the speaker’s right to mount a
soapbox and speak gibberish.
107 Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2649 (“[M]ost students . . . do not shed their brains at the schoolhouse gate,
and most students know dumb advocacy when they see it.”)
108 Id. at 2649, 2651. See Amar, supra note 58, at 442 (“[The dissenting opinion] assumed without
deciding that schools could ban speech advocating illegal drug use without demonstrating that
such speech would meet Tinker’s ‘substantial disruption’ standard but then concluded that the
school must show at least that ‘Frederick’s supposed advocacy stands a meaningful chance of
making otherwise [law abiding] students try marijuana.’ The school could not do this, the
dissenters believed, because the banner was essentially nonsensical, and did not contain any
discernable message advocating anything, much less illegal drug use.”)
109 See Student Press Law Center, Advocates counting on Alito, Kennedy concurrence to limit decision’s
scope at http://www.splc.org/report_detail.asp?id=1370&edition=43 at 1 (last visited Dec. 6,
2007; author retains copy).
110 Id. (“Many of the nation’s free-speech advocates focused on what they call the silver lining of the
Morse decision. Relying on Associate Justice Samuel Alito’s concurring opinion, in which
Associate Justice Kennedy joined, they believe the Court ensured that the new restriction
allowing censorship of speech advocating the use of illegal drugs does not extend to political or
religious speech. Adding Alito and Kennedy’s votes to the three dissenters . . . created a fragile
five-justice majority for rejecting a broad school-censorship ruling.”)
111 Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2629.
112 See Student Press Law Center, Chipping Away: U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Morse v. Frederick,
supra note 98, at 4 (“[The Journalism Education Association] an organization of journalism
teachers and advisors based at Kansas State University . . . released a statement warning
educators not to treat the decision as an invitation to restrict student expression that they think is
controversial.”)
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broad impact on students’ free speech rights.113 Still others have criticized the Court for
not going further to restrict student expression on the national level.114 Finally, one
commentator expressed concern about the unusual level of deference accorded to
school officials. The Court determined that Frederick’s banner might adversely affect
other students solely because of the principal’s opinion that it would do so. Likewise,
the record was devoid of evidence showing Frederick’s banner was likely to increase
illegal drug usage among the students. Rather the Court deferred to the school official’s
“predictive sense.”115
VI. EVOLVING IMPORTANCE OF THE ROLE OF PUBLIC EDUCATION
It is interesting to observe how the U.S. Supreme Court’s reliance on the role of
public education has evolved in its public school speech cases. The clearest statement
about the importance of the role of public education in resolving student speech cases
appears in Tinker:
Boards of Education . . . have, of course, important, delicate, and
highly discretionary functions, but none that they may not perform
within the limits of the Bill of Rights. That they are educating the
young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of
Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle
the free mind at it source and teach youth to discount important
principles of our government as mere platitudes.116

Student Press Law Center, Chipping Away: U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Morse v. Frederick,
supra note 98, at 4 (“Matthew Staver, the founder and chairman of the Liberty Counsel, which
also filed a friend-of-the-court brief supporting Frederick, said his organization is satisfied with
the outcome, despite being momentarily displeased with Frederick’s loss. ‘We were concerned
about this decision because it had the potential to undo free speech,’ Staver said. ‘But it appears
that the free-speech rights of students are still intact.’”)
114 Id. at 5 (“Some groups that supported Deborah Morse have criticized the Court for not going far
enough to limit student speech on a national level. Tom Hutton, the National School Boards
Association senior attorney, said he was somewhat disappointed that the decision, like Fraser,
has made only a single addition to the categories of speech that schools can regulate. ‘This is a
very ad hoc approach that doesn’t give anybody as much clarity and guidance as might be
helpful to avoid future litigation,’ he said. ‘We would have liked a little more discretion for
school officials.’”)
115 Amar, supra note 58, at 443. The U.S. Supreme Court has deferred to the judgment of school
officials in operational decisions, Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968), and Island Trees
Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864 (1982), but the Court has not been reluctant to
intervene in school board actions affecting speech. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987)
(statute prohibiting the teaching of evolution in public school without also teaching “creation
science” was unconstitutional); Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Pico, supra (school board
cannot direct the removal of library books because they disliked the ideas expressed in the
books); Epperson v. Arkansas, supra (statute prohibiting the teaching of Darwin’s theory of
evolution in public schools was unconstitutional); West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624 (1943) (public school students cannot be compelled to salute the flag); and Mayer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (state statute banning the teaching of foreign languages in public
schools violated the First Amendment).
116 Tinker, 89 S. Ct. at 737.
113
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In other words, schools will not succeed in teaching students to be vigilant about
protecting First Amendment rights if school officials throttle the exercise of those
freedoms in public schools.
The Supreme Court’s description of the role of public education shifted in Fraser.
The Court stated that public education prepares students to be citizens by developing in
them the “habits and manners of civility,” which are indispensable to “the practice of
self-government”117 and which include tolerance for the viewpoints of others,
consideration of the sensibilities of others, and socially appropriate behavior.118 In other
words, schools fulfill their role if they teach students to avoid the use of vulgar,
offensive, or threatening terms in their public utterances.
The majority opinion in Kuhlmeier does not address the role of public education in
resolving the First Amendment issues. Rather, the role of public education appears
only in the dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan: “Public education serves vital
national interests in preparing the Nation’s youth for life in our increasingly complex
society and for the duties of our democratic republic.”119
There was no mention of the role of public education in Morse. Hence, the role of
public school education has possibly been eliminated as a justification in the latest
iteration of protected student speech. Some have suggested that the declining role of
public education in resolving student speech cases is the result of what has occurred in
public schools since the Columbine shootings in 1999:
Since the 1999 Columbine shooting in Jefferson, Colo., which left 12
students, one teacher and the two shooters dead, officials have
become much more proactive in seeking out and disciplining
student speech that contains violent thoughts. Following the
shooting, many schools enacted zero-tolerance policies on speech or
writing that appeared to express a violent intent.120
Those policies “have banned students from wearing clothing or posting signs that
focus on drugs, guns or incendiary topics such a homosexuality, abortion and
religion,”121 and has prompted school officials to become “much more aggressive in this
era.”122 One First Amendment scholar opines “that the landscape for student speech
has changed significantly since the armband case in 1969,” and that “some judges have
been particularly influenced by Columbine and have cited it ‘explicitly in their
opinions’ supporting school officials, while others have more broadly interpreted
student rights under the 1960 ruling.”123 Indeed, the Columbine tragedy was explicitly
cited by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals as the basis for its decision upholding the
transfer of a student to another school upon discovering language in the student’s
journal threatening a “Columbine-style attack” on the school, holding that the student’s
threatening language is not protected by the Fifth Amendment, and expressly deferring

Fraser, 106 S. Ct. at 3164.
Id. at 3163, 3164.
119 Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. at 574.
120 See Student Press Law Center, Sensitive speech: High schools react to violent expression after Virginia
Tech massacre, at http://www.splc.org/printpage.asp?id=1365&tb=reports&edition=432 at 1
(last visited Dec. 8, 2007; author retains copy).
121 Joan Biskupic, High court case tests limits of student speech rights, USA TODAY, March 1, 2007, at 1A.
122 See Student Press Law Center, Sensitive speech: High schools react to violent expression after Virginia
Tech massacre, supra note 122, at 1.
123 Biskupic, supra note 121, at 2A (quoting David Hudson, an attorney with the First Amendment
Center at Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN).
117
118

Fall 2008/Bong Hits 4 Jesus/17

to school administrators’ judgment to “act quickly and decisively to address a threat of
physical violence against their students.”124 In the future, the deference of the U.S.
Supreme Court to the judgment of public school officials permitted by Morse will likely
replace the role of public education in resolving public school speech issues.125
VII. CONCLUSION
The U.S. Supreme Court has decided four major cases dealing with the First
Amendment rights of public school students. In the first, Tinker, the Court boldly
recognizes that public school student speech is protected by the First Amendment and
holds school officials to a tough standard in disciplining student speech: “the forbidden
conduct would ‘materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school,’"126 These rights were protected,
the Court said, to expose students to more viewpoints than those the state officially
provides and to let students appreciate First Amendment rights by experiencing them.
In the second decision, Fraser, the Court retreats and upholds the suspension
imposed of a student for including an explicit sexual metaphor in his nomination
speech. The Court justifies its decision on the grounds that younger students should be
protected from vulgar language and schools are supposed to incubate civility in school
children. In short, the Court added a second test for permitting school regulation of
student speech: schools are permitted to discipline students if their speech is lewd and
indecent. This test is designed to support the school’s role to teach students to be polite
and courteous in discussing matters with others, rather than permitting students to
exercise their First Amendment rights so that they appreciate their importance, as
advocated in Tinker.
In the third decision, Kuhlmeier, the Court upholds the right of school officials to
censor the student newspaper to ensure learning objectives are met, audiences are not
exposed to materials inappropriate to their age and maturity, and the school is able to
disassociate itself from expression that does not meet its educational standards. Hence,
the Court removes student speech that is inconsistent with the school’s educational
mission from the First Amendment protection provided by Tinker.
Finally, in Morse, the Court holds that suspending a student from school for
unfurling a banner during a high school sponsored and supervised event did not
violate the First Amendment, because his expression promoted illegal drug usage
contrary to school policy, and the school officials did not want the school to be
associated with speech that was contrary to the policies it was trying to promote. While
Morse may be limited to student speech promoting illegal drug usage in the future,
there is little doubt in this post-Columbine era that Morse permits far greater deference
to school officials’ efforts to curtail student speech, and that the historic role of public

Ponce v. Socorro Independent Sch. Dist., 508 F.3d 765, 771, 772 (2007) (“We do hold . . . that
when a student threatens violence against a student body, his words are as much beyond the
constitutional pale as yelling ‘fire’ in a crowded theater, and such specific threatening speech in a
school or its population is unprotected by the First Amendment. School administrators must be
permitted to react quickly and decisively to address a threat of physical violence against their
students, without worrying that they will have to face years of litigation second-guessing their
judgment as to whether the threat posed a real risk of substantial disturbance”) (citations
omitted).
125 See LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 987 (2001) (“[W]e live in a time when school
violence is an unfortunate reality that educators must confront on all too frequent basis.”)
126 Tinker, 89 S.Ct. at 739.
124
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school education in protecting student speech has been diluted. At the very least, Morse
shows how the U.S. Supreme Court operates under Chief Justice Roberts. The Court
effected a conservative result in a bare majority opinion without overturning
precedents while avoiding sweeping and expansive language in its holding.127 Morse
also extends a pattern of the Court in hearing, deciding and reversing a
disproportionate number of cases from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.128

127
128

Amar, supra note 58, at 442-443.
Id. at 443 (“Morse reversed [a] Ninth Circuit [ruling], and that was a common occurrence this
term. The Ninth Circuit was reversed 19 times—as many times as the First, Second, Third,
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Circuits combined—this year. This extraordinarily high
number of reversals is really attributable to the fact that the Court reviewed 21 cases from the
Western Circuit, a disproportionately high number even taking into account that the Ninth
Circuit processes the most cases of any circuit. This year, as in many recent years past, the Court
seems to be particularly interested in reviewing decisions from the Ninth. And perhaps more
important than the reversal rate of 19/21 is the Ninth Circuit’s propensity to be reversed
lopsidedly or unanimously. This term 8 of 21 Ninth Circuit decisions were reversed
unanimously. Overall, Ninth Circuit rulings garnered less than 2 votes (out of a possible 9) to
affirm when they arrived at the high Court. That compares to an average of all the other circuits
combined of over 3 ‘justice-votes-to-affirm-per-case reviewed,’ a metric I think is superior to
simple reversal rates for evaluating circuit relationships with the Supreme Court.”)

